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Abstract
In this paper, we focus on the halt of price discovery function in the financial markets and the
evaporation of market liquidity. We explore the mechanism of these phenomena by using simulation
techniques shown in Muranaga and Shimizu (1999). In order to generate evaporation of market
liquidity, we exogenously reduce traders’ expected values of asset. In one simulation, it is assumed
that market participants do not amend their expectations on future price levels in response to large
movements in market prices, but instead become more uncertain about whether the expectations would
be realised. The simulation result shows that the loss of market liquidity can play a role of a built-in
stabiliser in the market, and can prevent a precipitous drop in prices. As uncertainty increases, market
participants become less willing to trade, the number of orders declined, and, consequently, market
liquidity evaporates. When market liquidity is low, price discovery is not conducted as often, so an
endogenous (secondary) crash in prices is less likely to develop. In another simulation, it is assumed
that market participants amend their expectations on future prices in response to large price
movements and uncertainty remains unchanged. In this case, the simulation result suggests that
secondary crashes might develop. This is because order flows, which would not be interrupted, could
become one-way, reflecting the sharply lower expected future prices and triggering secondary crashes.
* Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank of Japan, the Committee on
the Global Financial System, or the Bank for International Settlements.1
1. Introduction
Market liquidity is a precondition for the smooth pursuit of all financial activities, including the
pricing of financial products, the risk management of financial institutions, and the conduct of
monetary policy. Looking back in detail at past financial crises, including Black Monday, the EMS
shock, and the recent Asian and Russian financial crises, the cessation of the market’s price discovery
function caused by a rapid decline in market liquidity was in each case the critical issue.
This paper explores the mechanism of market liquidity evaporation, which leads to the cessation of the
market’s price discovery function, using a simulation technique proposed by Muranaga and Shimizu
(1999). In order to analyse dynamics of market liquidity, we incorporate feedback mechanisms
through which traders modify their expectations of future asset price. Since we focus on the stressful
situation of the market, we give an initial exogenous shock to our artificial market and analyse the
generating process of market liquidity evaporation. The simulation results show the factors affecting
the process resulting in market cessation, and the factors affecting the process of the market’s
autonomous resumption following the state of cessation.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews microscopic understanding of
market liquidity evaporation. Section 3 presents the outline of the simulation, including the feedback
mechanism through which traders revise their expectations of asset. Section 4 shows the simulation
results. Our concluding remarks appear in Section 5.
2. Microscopic understanding of the phenomena
We interpret the cessation of the market’s price discovery function caused by market liquidity
evaporation as follows. When an equilibrium price is discovered at the market in normal times, supply
of and demand for asset are in equilibrium at market price Pt as shown in Figure 1. The horizontal
length of the triangles in the figure represents the volume of selling and buying limit orders which
remain unexecuted, and the vertical length represents the tick size or minimal price unit. If some
external shock causes the demand (or supply) curve to shift, and selling (or buying) order flows react
with a minimum length of lag so as to follow this shift, only one-off jump in price is observed.
However, it should be noted that the portion of the demand (supply) curve above (below) Pt is
regarded as the “effective supply and demand” which is actually not realised at the point of t.
1 In other
words, when an external shock causes a shift of the demand (or supply) curve, and leads to a shift of
buying (or selling) order book, there may be cases which actual orders are not realised immediately
following such shifts. If, on the one hand, effective supply and demand are realised as actual orders
leading gradually toward the new equilibrium, we will observe a selling climax at which price changes
gradually tend to one direction (Roll [1988]). If, on the other hand, it takes a substantial time for
effective supply and demand to become realised as actual orders, we will face a situation in which
trades are not executed because of the wide divergence of the best bid and the best ask or
disappearance of buying (selling) limit orders.
1 See Muranaga and Shimizu (1999) for discussion about “effective supply and demand.”2












As suggested in the analysis of Lanterbach and Ben-zion (1993), the above cases are based on the
supposition that it is a supply-demand imbalance which leads to a cessation of the price discovery
function because there is some friction which prevents the underlying effective supply and demand
from being realised. When we look further into the details of such process, we can see that the way in
which market participants’ expected value of assets and future market liquidity alters, especially under
the effects of external shocks, does play an important role. The price discovery process will be
affected in various ways, according to the speed and magnitude of such expectation change. In some
cases, the demand curve alone shifts rapidly to the left while becoming more steep, reflecting a decline
of the price elasticity of demand, resulting in the delay in the realisation of effective supply and
demand  (Figure 2-1).  In  other  cases,  the  demand  curve  shifts  to  the  left  while  the  supply  curve
becomes more flat, reflecting a rapid increase in the price elasticity of supply, which results in the
disappearance of (both selling and buying) orders (Figure 2-2). Changes in the price elasticity of
supply and demand are observed through changes in the order-book profile.






























During such phenomena, each market participant decides his/her ability to exit market based on their
expectation of future price and market liquidity, and as a result, his/her behaviour such as expediting
or delaying orders will be observed. According to Gerety and Mulherin (1992) and Subrahmanyam3
(1994), such a behavioural mechanism is observed in daily transactions through the increased trade
volume toward closing, and can be rationally derived when considering trading behaviour in multiple
periods. What becomes crucial here are: how expectations about price and market liquidity are
formed; how risk is recognised based on such expectations; and how a market participant decides the
type of order by comparing the recognised risk with his/her own risk tolerance. By analysing such
realising mechanism of trade needs, we can clarify the halt and resumption of the price discovery
function.
3. Outline of the model and simulation
This paper employs an extended version of the trader model and the trade execution model used in
Muranaga and Shimizu (1999). There are two types of traders in the market: “momentum traders” who
make market orders following short-term market trends, and “value traders” who place limit orders
based on their certain expectations such as expected values of asset and confidence in their own
forecasts. As for the trade execution model, we employ a continuous auction system following that of
the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).
Muranaga and Shimizu (1999) assume that each trader’s variables such as expected value, confidence
in forecast, and risk preferences are constant. This approach interpreted to observe the effects of
changes in the above variables caused by different market microstructures. In the actual market,
however, traders are believed to revise those variables by monitoring market information. In order to
analyse dynamics of the mechanism through which traders’ potential trade needs realise corresponding
to changes in market environment, we incorporate feedback mechanisms through which traders
modify their expectations of asset. Since our analysis deals with the decline in market liquidity and the
cessation of price discovery function, we give an initial exogenous shock by changing all traders’
expected values at once,
2 and observe the process in which this shock leads to a stressful situation of
the market.
As for feedback effects, we will consider two of the most simple mechanisms: (1) feedback to trader’s
expected value, and (2)  feedback to trader’s confidence in expectation. As shown in Figure  3-1,
feedback mechanism to expected value is that a trader revises his/her own expected value based on
market information he/she receives. Specifically, when trader i, who holds initial expected value  0 ,
~
i P ,
observes that the market price just before his/her order is below a certain confidence level
3 of his/her
expected distribution of P
~
 (g ), he/she forecast an market equilibrium price based on the market trend
and revise  t i P,
~
 accordingly.
As  shown  in  Figure 3-2,  feedback  to  confidence  is  that  a  trader  revises  his/her  confidence  in
expectation, that is, variance of traders’ expected values, based on market information he/she receives.
Specifically, when trader i, who holds initial expected variance of  0 , i g , observes that the market price
just before his/her order is below the “trigger,” he/she revises g  of time t to  t i, g , so that observed
market price will fall within the range above the ‘trigger.’
2 We assume that there was a public announcement which gives downward shock for prices, reduce all value traders’
expected values by 5%.
3 Hereafter, we call the certain confidence level which causes such revision as “trigger.”4

























Figure 4 shows a set of paths of execution price drawn by the simulation. Traders consist of 50 value
traders, who revise their expected values at trigger level of 20 percentile, and 10 momentum traders.
As an initial shock, we reduced value traders’ expected values by 5% after the end of period 75.
Movements of execution price before the shock have been within 20 yen range around 1,000 yen,
which is the average of traders’ expected values, while the price movements became widely dispersed
after the shock. Figure 5 shows a histogram of the final execution price after the whole simulation.
The average of final execution price was 947 yen, a level which was about 5% lower than 1,000 yen
and consistent with the magnitude of the initial shock, while price dispersion became quite large
compared with the pre-shock range (above/below 20 yen). These results imply that the existence of
feedback seems to have substantial effects on the instability of the market’s price discovery function,
that is, on market efficiency and stability when exogenous shock has been added to the market.5














Figure 5. Histogram of the final trade prices at the end of the simulation



























4.1 Effects of trigger level
By conducting simulations for the feedback to expected value and feedback to confidence, we have
observed (1) a convergence of traders’ expected values, and (2) an increase of risk which traders
recognise. The effects of trigger level in the simulations applying the feedback to expected value and
the feedback to confidence are shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. Here, higher trigger level
means more frequent feedback. Figure 6 shows that, as trigger level increases, the distribution of
traders’ expected values converges, in shorter period, around the average. This suggests that, feedback
more frequently reaches traders whose expected values are further from the average of all traders’
expectations, thereby revising the traders expectations close to the average of the actual distribution in
a shorter period of time. From Figure 7, we can see that as the trigger level increases, the average of
the extent of traders’ risk aversion reaches a higher level, and the time needed to reach a certain level
becomes shorter. As was the case for the feedback to expected values, when the trigger level increases,
the feedback more frequently reaches traders whose expected values are further from the average of
the true distribution of traders’ expectations, thereby risk or uncertainty the traders increases more
rapidly.
Figure 8 shows the features of market data when the trigger of feedback to expected value is changed.
The indicators we observe are the same as those Muranaga and Shimizu (1999) observe. From
Figures 8-1 to 8-6, we can see that as the trigger level increases, probability of quote existence, trade
frequency, volatility of trade price, volatility of mean price, average spread, and gross order book
volume all decrease. When we look at Figures 8-7 and 8-8, volatility of the gross order book volume
and standard deviation of the net order volume are not affected a great deal.
Figure 9 shows the features of market data when the trigger of feedback to confidence is changed. As
the trigger level raises, trade frequency declines (Figure 9-2). Other indicators do not show clear
tendency against the changes in trigger level.7
Figure 6. Convergence of traders’ expected values
(feedback to expected value)














































































Figure 7. Increase in traders’ estimated risks
(feedback to confidence)












































































































































































Figure 8. Effects of trigger level (feedback to expected value)
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Figure 9. Effects of trigger level (feedback to confidence)
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4.2 Analysis of stress
By observing endogenous stress phenomenon triggered by exogenous initial shock concerning price
information, we have shown the possibility that different feedback mechanism generates different
stress. Specifically, by comparing a case in which there is a feedback to value traders’ expected values
(value-feedback-type stress) with a case in which there is a feedback to traders’ confidence
(confidence-feedback-type stress), we observe difference in (1) the cessation period of price discovery
function after the shock, and (2) the realisation process of potential transaction demand. In other
words, depending on the type of stress, there seems to be difference in the state of market liquidity and
the possibility of endogenous crash to be generated.
Figure 10 shows how trade cessation period
4 after the initial shock differs for the above mentioned two
types of stress when trigger level has been changed. We can see that, regardless of the trigger level,
cessation period is longer in the case of value-feedback-type stress. In addition, cessation period tends
to become longer as trigger level increases from 5 to 20%. On the one hand, in the case of
value-feedback-type stress, initial shock seems to affect traders’ future price expectation, thereby
shifts the demand curve (as we summarised in Section 2), and thus making it difficult to discover new
equilibrium price. This interpretation is consistent with the tendency that the cessation period of price
discovery function becomes longer as the pace of demand-curve shift accelerates. On the other hand,
in the case of confidence-feedback-type stress, not the shift of demand curve but the decline in
confidence hampers the realisation of potential transaction demand, and thus the cessation of price
discovery function is less likely to happen compared with the case of value-feedback-type stress.
Figure 10. Effects of trigger level on periods of trading halts




















Note: “E” in the settings means feedback to expected value, while “C” means feedback to confidence.
Figures in each setting denote the trigger level of traders’ expectations revision.
Figure 11 shows in more detail about the features of generating mechanism for value-feedback-type
stress and confidence-feedback-type stress. For each type of stress, and with the trigger level at 5%
and 15%, the Figures illustrate the realisation of the limit order book (solid line. positive side for the
4 Cessation period refers to a period in which trade has been executed less than once on average after the initial shock, that
is, after the 75th period.12
volume of buying order book and negative side for the volume of selling order book) and price
movements (bar graph) after the initial shock. We can see that, when trigger level is at 5%
(Figures 11-1 and 11-2), buying order book disappears in about 2 periods after the shock and selling
order book rapidly increases over 7 to 8 periods for both types of stress. Price movements peaks out
over 7 to 8 periods and, along with the realisation of buying order book, stop declining over 8 to
10 periods.
When trigger level is at 15%, confidence-feedback-type stress (Figure 11-3) shows little difference in
post-shock book disappearance/realisation processes compared with the case of trigger level at 5%
(Figure  11-1). In the case of value-feedback-type stress, however, selling book rapidly increases
(Figure 11-4), and its volume reaches, by 10 periods, to the level which is 40% more than that at the
5%  trigger  level  (Figure 11-2).  With  respect to  price  movements,  confidence-feedback-type  stress
shows little difference between 5% and 15% trigger levels, while value-feedback-type stress,
reflecting the increasing pressure of selling order book realisation, induced secondary crash (rapid fall
in price) at the 15% trigger level over 10 to 11 periods.
Figure 11. Developments in price movement and order flows






















































































































































































































































































Above simulation results suggest that there is not one but several stress generating mechanisms
depending on the type of feedback mechanism lying behind. In particular, the pressure to realise
selling orders after the price shock may induce further crash in the market. Taking into account that
the two types of stresses have different effects on the cessation of price discovery function, decline in
market liquidity (delay in selling order realisation) may serve as a mechanism to avoid further drop in
prices and avoid the long cessation of market discovery function in the case of
confidence-feedback-type stress, in which market participants’ price expectation does not shift
significantly but their confidence decline after the shock. These findings awaits future verification for
their robustness by using actual market data, although they are deemed useful in deepening our13
understanding about the stress generating mechanism in the market and about the role played by
market liquidity.
5. Conclusions and further issues
In this paper, we constructed a hypothetical model consisting of hypothetical traders, who are
characterised by various endogenous variables such as expected value and the confidence on it, and a
hypothetical execution system which matches the orders from the traders, and conducted analyses
based on a Monte Carlo simulation. Specifically, in order to analyse market behaviour at the
occurrence of stress, we have incorporated traders’ expected values and feedback effects to
confidence.
The simulation results suggest that (1) stress generation pattern differs depending on the feedback
mechanism, value feedback or confidence feedback, (2) post-shock cessation period of price discovery
function is longer when the stress is value-feedback type, and (3) when feedback affects trader’s
confidence, further crash in price is unlikely to occur because of the liquidity constraints.
Our future tasks include: (1) verify the validity of the model by comparing the results with those
obtained from empirical analyses, and (2) continue our consideration about the feedback effects on
parameters other than expected price and confidence, or about the setting of the trigger. In addition,
(3) based on our findings about the stress generating mechanism, autonomous restoration mechanism
after the market crash and the effectiveness of artificial stress preventing mechanism, such as circuit
breaker system, should be examined.14
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